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Much has been written in recent years about the urgency to develop new technologies that meet 
ambitious targets for more efficient energy infrastructure with reduced reliance on fossil fuels. 
There has also been growing recognition that mineral scarcity can hamper the speed of key 
technologies being developed. The dominance of China as a global supplier of many technology 
minerals and the Chinese government’s ability to constrain supply has led to a focus on the 
international trade dimensions of the challenge. The United States, Japan, the European Union 
and South Korea have all been keenly focused on securing mineral supply for their domestic 
industries through a range of initiatives. These efforts have included the World Trade 
Organization dispute resolution mechanism; research investment in alternative and more widely 
available materials where possible; and considering strategic stockpiles of minerals from internal 
sources that harken back to Cold War era strategies for material security. 
 
In this report, we argue that a neglected area in addressing the mineral scarcity challenge is the 
private sector’s current trajectory for geological mineral exploration of key minerals and 
innovative initiatives on material efficiency and recycling where possible. We term this approach 
Smart Mineral Enterprise Development (SMED) which entails a partnership between public and 
private entities to consider pathways whereby public sector data sharing on geology can be 
coupled with research innovations in the private sector both upstream and downstream of 
mineral supply.  Just as smart energy grids harness efficiencies in electricity supply and demand 
through a dynamic process of communication, SMED processes can do the same for key 
technological bottlenecks in mineral supply.  We focus on cobalt to highlight the bottlenecks; 
identify alternative supply sources based on current exploration and recycling technologies; 
propose ways in which the international legal framework could be adapted to promote 
investments in critical minerals; and consider ways by which the public sector can assist the 
private sector in developing a SMED process that would bring forth more efficient and effective 
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On December 20, 2017, the United States Geological Survey published its first critical minerals 
assessment since 1973. The findings were stark and sobering to those concerned about American 
dependence on foreign-sourced commodities. The report noted that out of the 23 key minerals on 
which the American economy is most dependent 21 have more than 50% of their demand met 
from imports
2
. Beryllium and titanium were the notable exceptions. The report raised enough 
alarm bells that President Trump issued an executive order the very next day to expand critical 
minerals production by "increasing activity at all levels of the supply chain, including 
exploration, mining, concentration, separation, alloying, recycling and reprocessing critical 
minerals.”3 Yet, the mechanisms by which this production could best be facilitated have eluded 
much discussion.  
 
A lot of these critical minerals highlighted in the survey are needed for the development of 
renewable energies. Harnessing the supply at the global level is necessary to achieve the Paris 
Climate Agreement. The Agreement, signed in December 2015, is a landmark global treaty 
committing all participant countries to reducing carbon emissions and limiting global 
temperature rise to below two degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. This historic 
agreement cemented the world’s commitment to combating climate change and set the stage for 
exponential growth in the demand for renewable-energy and energy-efficient technologies. To 
achieve the ambitious goals of the Paris Agreement, worldwide production of sustainable 
technologies must increase drastically, far beyond current levels. Article 10 of the Agreement 
highlights the importance of green technology for achieving global climate goals, calling for 
green tech growth, innovation, enhancement, and transfer: 
  
“1. Parties share a long-term vision on the importance of fully realizing technology 
development and transfer in order to improve resilience to climate change and to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. 
  
2. Parties, noting the importance of technology for the implementation of mitigation and 
adaptation actions under this Agreement and recognizing existing technology deployment 
and dissemination efforts, shall strengthen cooperative action on technology development 
and transfer.”4 
  
And while the Paris agreement recognizes green technology as an essential element in achieving 
climate goals, research performed on the feasibility of actually developing, building, and 
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reliable-supplies-critical-minerals/. (Accessed 23 Jan. 2018). 




deploying green technology at this scale has been insufficient. In reality, these sustainable 
technologies are highly material-intensive and will require the mining and refining of a wide 
range and vast quantities of “technology minerals” from which to produce the technology metals, 
alloys, and chemical compounds required. This supply does not yet exist, raising serious 
concerns about where, and how the world will procure enough supply to meet growing demand. 
If the goals of the Paris Agreement are to be met, the supply of technology minerals must 
increase drastically.  
 
Technology minerals—defined as the geological sources for the metals, alloys, and chemical 
compounds used in the production of modern technology—are critical in the production of 
nearly all green technologies. Technology minerals are used to increase efficiency, decrease 
weight, prolong battery life, and a myriad of other essential functions. Although often used in 
trace amounts and abundant in the Earth’s crust, depending on access to these critical materials 
can be extremely risky due to the paucity of their availability to mining in accessible deposits, 
and awareness of their importance is largely unknown outside of the mining and tech industries. 
Thus, this paper distinguishes between physical supply (i.e. what exists on earth in a geological 
sense) and practical supply (i.e. what is available globally, with consideration for technical, 
political, and economic influences and consequences). Vast amounts of technology minerals 
exist in the Earth’s crust in varying concentrations, meaning there is no theoretical risk of 
physical supply shortage. However, financial, geopolitical, and technical issues render the 
practical supply of them at risk of shortage. As such, producing and securing a reliable global 
supply of technology minerals is paramount and the practical scarcity of supply of most of the 
technology minerals represents a significant obstacle to the future of renewable- and energy-
efficient technologies, and their continuous supply is already in jeopardy.  
 
This paper will discuss ways of addressing the tenuous global supply—as an overlooked yet 
fundamental element to achieving the goals of the Paris Agreement and the future of the green 
economy. The paper first defines “criticality”, a term used to determine which minerals are most 
important to the advancement of green technology. Then, based on this determination, we focus 
on cobalt as a case study of a mineral that is likely to be essential for green technologies and 
where a supply shortage appears unavoidable.  In its central piece, the paper covers various 
investment solutions to address the supply shortage but in particular hones in on a mechanism 
that the authors coined as the “Smart Mineral Enterprise Development (SMED)” which entails a 
partnership between public and private entities whereby public sector data sharing on geology 
can be coupled with research innovations in the private sector both upstream and downstream of 
mineral supply.  
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2. Technology Minerals and Criticality for Green Technology 
 
In 2010, the United States Department of Energy (DOE) commissioned the Critical Materials 
Strategy to determine “the extent to which widespread deployment of [renewable energy] 
technologies may increase worldwide demand for rare earth elements and certain other 
materials.”5 Separately, the European Union (EU) created its own criticality report in 2010 
(updated in 2014), evaluating 54 raw materials to discern their criticality to the EU economy.
6
 
Other nations, trade and industry associations, and scientific organizations have created similar 
measurement tools to evaluate the criticality of raw materials based on economic importance and 
identified supply risk factors. The goal of these criticality assessments has been to determine 
which materials are essential to the economic well-being of each nation (or bloc in the case of 
the EU), and to raise awareness and/or influence legislation that will further secure the national 
supply of these critical materials.  
 
The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) has undertaken the following 
assessment report with a different, two-pronged goal in mind. First, it provides an overview of 
which minerals should be considered critical in the next decade, and why. Fundamental 
innovations in renewable energy and sustainability technology, and the raw materials used to 
produce them, have caused increased supply and demand for certain materials and decreased 
supply and demand for others. Many technology minerals deemed critical just three years ago are 
now considered either secure or no longer important, while others considered non-critical in 
2014 are now essential to the future of green technology. This report reflects the current state of 
criticality among the technology minerals.  
 
Second, CCSI performed this research by focusing specifically on the global markets for 
technology minerals rather than analyzing the industry from a national or regional supply 
security perspective. The economic well-being of specific countries is not considered. This paper 
does not make suggestions on how countries can create self-reliance; rather it seeks to raise 
awareness across the public and private sectors of the criticality of key technology minerals in 
the green technology industry, put forth an analysis of the major players in the production of 
these minerals, and present recommendations for the future technology mineral marketplace as 
green technology continues to expand.  
 
To structure this research, CCSI developed a criticality assessment focused specifically on 
technology minerals used in the production of solar energy, wind energy, electric vehicles (EVs), 
storage batteries, fuel cells, and carbon capture and sequestration. It is based on the economic 
importance of the technology minerals to the production of green technology, and the supply risk 
associated with procuring the necessary quantity of mineral to meet demand. Furthermore, it 
incorporates the ability for the mineral to be substituted for another material in an end product. 
The less feasible this substitution is, the higher criticality the technological mineral was 
considered to be. This assessment is informed by primary interviews with industry experts, 
                                                     
5 U.S. Department of Energy, 2010 Critical Materials Summary Strategy, 2010. Available at: 
https://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/edg/news/documents/Critical_Materials_Summary.pdf (Accessed 31 Feb. 2017). 




market analyses and projections of green technologies, and published reports that have sought to 
measure the relative importance of key raw materials.   
 
Based on our defined methodology for criticality, we have identified Lithium and Cobalt as 
having the highest criticality and significance for the future of global green technology. We also 
identified two rare earth elements, Neodymium and Dysprosium; the very rare chalcogenide, 
Tellurium; and the rare member of the aluminum family, Indium. As essential elements of 
renewable technologies, these technology minerals are fundamental to the economic growth and 
stability of all nations, and to the success of the Paris Agreement. Securing consistent, reliable, 
and sustainable global access to these materials is of increasing concern and importance. Table 1 
provides a summary of key characteristics of these minerals. 
 







Key uses in green-
tech 
Lithium Chile, Argentina, 
Australia, China 
Bolivia, Canada Battery storage devices 
for smart grids 





Battery storage in EVs  
Neodymium China, Australia Greenland, USA, 
Brazil, Russia 
Magnets in wind power 
turbines 






Magnets in EVs and 
wind turbines 







Indium China, Republic of 









Out of these critical metals identified, we will consider cobalt as a focused case study in this 
report, owing to the most serious set of challenges around its supply, the lack of potential 
alternatives in the short-term for its usage in battery technologies associated with 




3. Cobalt as a Case Example of Enterprise Deficit 
 
Cobalt background and uses: Cobalt is a silver brittle metal that has a high melting point and is 
of great value due to its adding high wear resistance and strength at high temperatures in its 
alloys. It is one of three naturally occurring magnetic metals (along with iron and nickel). In 
addition, it retains its magnetic properties at higher temperatures than any other metal: this 
makes cobalt the metal with the highest curie point, the point at which a metal loses its 
permanent magnetic properties. Cobalt was thrust into significance in industry with the creation 
of aluminum-nickel-cobalt (or AlNiCo) magnets in the 1940s, which were used to replace 
electromagnets. In the 1970s, samarium-cobalt magnets were designed, which had magnetic 
energy density values that were previously unachievable.
7
 In fact, samarium-cobalt magnets 
were the first rare earth permanent magnets used by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) 
automotive industry; they were superseded by neodymium iron boron magnets in the early 1980s 
due to the sudden increase then in the price of cobalt. 
 
Cobalt has been used as a “technology enabling” element in alloys and compounds and is used in 
a wide range of technologies—from energy storage systems and catalytic processes to enabling 
greater efficiencies in the operation of gas turbines and chemical processes. It has become an 
integral component to powering electric vehicles, finds its uses in wind and wave generators, and 
is a catalyst used for the “splitting” of water in solar energy technologies.8 
 
In recent years, cobalt demand has been rising due to its usage in rechargeable batteries. In 
nickel-cadmium (Ni-Cd) batteries, cobalt makes up about 1-5% of the battery by weight. Cobalt 
usage is about 15% by weight in nickel-metal hybrid batteries, and lithium-ion batteries contain 
up to 50% cobalt by weight. The use of cobalt in rechargeable batteries has grown by about 13% 
annually over the last ten years whereas its uses for metallurgical applications has only grown by 
about 3.4%. Therefore, it is safe to assume that rechargeable batteries will be the main driver for 
cobalt demand in the future.
9  
 
Cobalt supply and demand: In 2016, cobalt consumption worldwide was estimated to be around 
93,950 tonnes.
 10
 The forecast of demand growth varies from outlet to outlet but all are bullish. 
By some estimates, cobalt demand is estimated to increase by approximately 30% by 2020, 
reaching 120,000 tonnes per year.
 11
 Other estimates provide that by the year 2025, the cobalt 




Around 17 kilograms of cobalt is needed per battery. Estimations show that half a million units 
of the Tesla Model 3 would require around 7,800 tons of new cobalt or roughly 6% of the current 
                                                     
7 Terrence Bell, “Cobalt Metal: Properties, Production, and Applications,” The Balance. August 19, 2017, 
https://www.thebalance.com/metal-profile-cobalt-2340131 (accessed April 31, 2017). 
8 “Why Cobalt?,” Cobalt Power Group. 2016, http://www.cobaltpowergroup.com/why-cobalt/ (accessed April 31, 2017). 
9 “A Brief Cobalt Primer,” Palisade Research. 2016, http://palisade-research.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/2016.10.26-
Palisade-Research-Cobalt-Final.pdf (accessed April 8, 2017). 
10 “Cobalt Demand,” Global Energy Metals Corp.,  https://www.globalenergymetals.com/cobalt/cobalt-demand/ (accessed 
November 2017) 
11 Global Energy Metals Corp., Cobalt Demand 
12 “Specialty Minerals and Metals,” Canaccord Genuity, Global Equity Research, 25 May 2017 
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world’s annual cobalt production.13 Japan and South Korea are leaders in battery and cathode 
technology development and host the headquarters of many electronic giants and their 
manufacturing units.
14
 Asia accounted for about 70.2% of the world’s cobalt consumption in 
2015, with China alone using 38.5% for its EV production industry.
15
 By 2020, numbers are 
projected to change only slightly, with Asia forecasted to consume 71.1%, and China’s demand 
falling slightly to 38%. As mentioned above, the demand for EVs and growth in battery 




The supply of cobalt is characterized by a few distinct aspects that contribute to its potential 
future shortage. For one, the Democratic Republic of Congo, which produces around 60% of the 
world’s supply of cobalt is mired in political strife, conflict, and corruption. The bulk of the 




Figure 1: Global Cobalt Production  
 




Second, cobalt, like many critical minerals, is almost entirely (90%) produced as a byproduct of 
other ore mining operations, and therefore fails to drive investment on its own financial merits. 
Figure 2 – the wheel of metal companionability – shows that cobalt is a byproduct of copper, 
nickel and platinum (the host metals are shown in the inner circle and companion elements in the 
                                                     
13 Sebastian Gandon, “No cobalt, no Tesla?,” TechCrunch. January , 2017, https://techcrunch.com/2017/01/01/no-cobalt-no-tesla/ 
(accessed 13 Jun. 2017). 
14 Leo Lewis, “Japan Inc prepares to defend its lead in battery power: Technological advances give Japanese groups an 
advantage,” Financial Times, October 23, 2017.  
https://www.ft.com/content/6c821340-a1d8-11e7-8d56-98a09be71849 (accessed November 2017) 
15 Palisade Research, A Brief Cobalt Primer. 
16 Jack Lifton. Personal Interview. (2017) 
17 “The Importance of Cobalt” LiCo Energy Metals, Inc., 2017. https://licoenergymetals.com/cobalt/ 
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outer circle, with the distance representing proportionality). Figure 3 shows that the cobalt 
proportion between 2006 and 2012 in host copper and nickel deposits has fallen.  The survival of 
a cobalt project therefore largely depends on nickel and copper prices. If the prices of these two 
metals are unfavorable, then it is highly unlikely that a mining project will undergo development, 
regardless of how high cobalt prices are. Some experts believe that cobalt prices would need to 
increase by at least a factor of 20 relative to the prices of nickel and copper before a cobalt 
extraction project can be considered financially viable.
18
 Figure 4 shows the impact of the recent 
price surge in cobalt on Copper-Cobalt and Nickel-Cobalt mine revenues that have a 10:1 cobalt 
byproduct ratio (roughly in line with Figure 5). Because of the scale of copper versus cobalt 
output at many of the current mines, a major rise in the price of cobalt does not have a significant 
impact on the revenues of the miners. The economics do not justify the upfront cost and risks, in 
particular when in addition to the economic risks, political and social risks are numerous like in 
DRC.
19
 Box 1 gives the perspective of the product development manager at Freeport Cobalt on 
these issues.  
 
Figure 2 (left): The Wheel of Metal Companionability
20
;  
Figure 3 (right): Companionability dynamics of cobalt
21
 (dark blue is cobalt, blue is nickel and 






                                                     
18 Flora Wood, Tina Litzinger & Mark Sitter. Personal Interview. (April, 2017) 
19 Todd Frankel, “THE COBALT PIPELINE: Tracing the path from deadly hand-dug mines in Congo to consumers’ phones and 
laptops,” Washington Post. [online]. September 30, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/business/batteries/congo-
cobalt-mining-for-lithium-ion-battery/ (accessed 16 May 2017). 
20 N.T. Nassar, N., T.E. Graedel, and E. M. Harper, By-product metals are technologically essential but have problematic supply. 
(Science Advance, April 3, 2015) 
21 N.T. Nassar, N., T.E. Graedel, and E. M. Harper, By-product metals are technologically essential but have problematic supply.  
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Figure 4 (left): Prices of Copper, Nickel and Cobalt
22
 
Figure 5 (right): Total revenue of a hypothetical copper and nickel mine that produces one 





Up to now, cobalt, while essential to green tech, is considered a nuisance more than a business 
opportunity by many investors. The processing required to separate cobalt from copper or nickel 
is immensely complicated and expensive. Rather than invest in this technology, major mining 
companies prefer to expand their core business (i.e. copper or nickel mining) and focus on short-
term profits. 
 
Box 1: Interview with Dan Carroll, Manager, Product Development at Freeport Cobalt 
(Responsible for market/supply & demand analysis for refined cobalt metal and chemicals.) 
1. How does one assess the success of a potential mining project i.e. projects in the 
prospecting or exploration stages? 
 
“This is not a simple question to answer. Successful exploration relies on the 
interpretation of the mine site geology, geochemistry and geophysics along with other 
factors related to the environment (i.e. water, plant and wildlife), community relations, 
government regulations, etc. Each exploration project is different.” 
 
2. How would you describe the exploration and investing space for cobalt right now? 
 
“Remember, over 85-90% of the cobalt supply is a by-product of copper and nickel 
mining. Copper and nickel prices (supply/demand) determine how much copper and 
nickel is mined each year and how much cobalt by-product is brought to the market. 
The number of primary cobalt mines are limited because they have not been 
economically feasible. Primary mines must have ore bodies that allow the mine to 
                                                     
22 Crowdz - Corporate Info. Cobalt: The Weak Link In Tesla's Supply Chain | Crowdz - Corporate Info, 2017, 
https://zsupplychain.com/2017/04/08/cobalt-the-weak-link-in-tesla39s-supply-chain/ (accessed 11 Aug. 2017). 
23 Crowdz - Corporate Info. Cobalt: The Weak Link In Tesla's Supply Chain | Crowdz - Corporate Info, 2017.  
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survive operationally when cobalt prices are low. Today, the cobalt prices are high and 
there is a big risk for those who invest in new (potential) primary cobalt mine sites, 
especially when you consider it takes 3-4 years to bring the mine to operation. Most of 
these exploration projects assume the price of cobalt will remain at today’s levels or 
higher than the historical average. This may be a questionable assumption.” 
 
3. How do you think this space will change in the near future? 
 
“Mining is mining. You only initiate a mining project if it is economically feasible and 
there is enough long term demand for the metal.” 
 
4. Are there regions you consider riskier when exploring and developing a cobalt 
resource? If so, what regions are they and why? If not, why? 
 
“Again, cobalt supply is mainly a by-product of copper and nickel mining. Mine sites are 
located in areas where environmental factors, community relations, government 
regulations, politics, infrastructure, logistics, manpower, available energy, etc. come into 
play in determining the risk of a new mine site. In 2016, approximately 55% of the mined 
cobalt came from copper mines in the DRC. These risk factors above come into play in 
the DRC. Even with these risk factors, copper mining and the supply of cobalt by-product 
from the DRC has been successful for stakeholders for several years.” 
 
Rio Tinto, one of the largest global mining groups with operations in 35 countries across the 
world, exemplifies the conundrum of cobalt production. Rio Tinto mines several minerals 
including aluminum, copper and iron ore. For Rio Tinto, the current market for cobalt is too 
small, with worldwide production around 100,000 metric tons, to sink heavy investment into 
processing and production. In contrast, worldwide copper production in 2016 was around 19.4 
million metric tons
24
. And even though cobalt demand is expected to grow in the future, the 
company would rather reinvest profits in its core business—copper—and continue to churn out 
profits for investors. 
 
 
As a result of this situation, the likelihood of a serious disjuncture between supply and demand 
for cobalt based on the aforementioned needs of the battery sector is high (see Figure 6).  
 
                                                     
24 U.S. Geological Survey. Copper, USGS Mineral Commodity Summaries 2017.  
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Only recently, driven by the increase in price, has there been an increased push for cobalt 
exploration. This exploration is carried out by “junior companies” (i.e. small companies 
specializing in exploration and developing a mining operation). These companies often find a 
mineral deposit, and
 
then work as fundraisers trying to rope financiers into investing in the 
development of a mining facility to reach production. Junior companies often survive through 
cash injections and salesmanship, but rarely become producers. In the survey below, we give a 
comprehensive overview of current private investment in cobalt mining.
 
Cobalt Supply Prospects  
To assess prospects of future supply, we have used a survey to determine the current global 
distribution of cobalt exploration projects, noting their stage of exploration. To this end, we 
compiled a database of projects from which a distribution map and a selection of noteworthy 
projects were produced. The technology minerals sector is highly clandestine and much of the 
information on supply and demand is not publicly available or is incomplete. Thus to supplement 
the material that was available online we conducted interviews and a survey of key experts and 
                                                     
25 “Specialty Minerals and Metals,” Canaccord Genuity, Global Equity Research, 25 May 2017 
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corporate interests to ensure we had the most current material for this report. Details on the 
methodology used for this survey can be found in Appendix A. The list of the cobalt companies 
reviewed in the survey can be accessed via an accompanying excel file to this document. 
 
Cobalt exploration and potentially commercially viable projects are concentrated in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Canada, and Australia. Of the 67 projects surveyed, 
about 25% are in advanced exploration or development stages. Figure 7 and Figure 8 give an 
overview of the summary results by region and stage of development. Figure 9 is a spatial map 
of the identified projects. 
 
Figure 7: Distribution stage of cobalt exploration projects;  





                                                     
26 The same analysis was performed for lithium, with the results shown in the Appendix C. 
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Following data compilation, analysis, and reconciliation, five projects were determined to be 
noteworthy. This selection of projects was based on the stage of exploration, media support for 
project development, corroborated statements on funding for project development in news 
reports, analyst reports, or company presentations. 
 
Noteworthy cobalt exploration projects include: 
1. Idaho Cobalt: Wholly owned by eCobalt, this development-stage project was initially 
planned to come online in 2013, but activities were put on hold due to depressed prices. 
Given the more favorable price outlook in 2016, the company re-started exploration 
activities at the site and as of September 2017, the project is fully permitted with an 
updated feasibility report published on SEDAR on November 10, 2017. Following 
project development in 2018, the company expects to reach full production in the third 
quarter of 2018. The project is in Idaho, USA with a projected weighted annual cobalt 
production of approximately 1,000 tonnes. 
2. KCC Material Assets: This development-stage project in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC) is jointly owned by Katanga Mining Ltd. (KML) (75%), La Generale des 
Carrieres et des Mines (GCM) and La Societe Immobiliere du Congo (SIMCO) (25%) 
via Kamoto Copper Company (KCC). Glencore has an 86.33% stake in the project. The 
project has been plagued by operational, legal, and financial hiccups over the last two 
years, but it remains one of the world’s largest with defined reserves of about 90.9 
15 
 
million tonnes with average cobalt and copper grades
27
 of 0.45% and 4.14% 
respectively.
28
 The company published a feasibility report in March 2017 and hopes to 
reach full capacity early 2018.  
3. Clean TeQ Sunrise: This is a development-stage Scandium-Cobalt project in New South 
Wales, Australia. The project is wholly owned by Clean TeQ Holdings through which 
China’s Pengxin International Mining holds a 16.5% stake. As of April 2017, the pilot 
plant has processed about 20 tonnes of ore, and in August 2017 the company announced 
an offtake agreement with Beijing Easpring for 20% of cobalt production with the option 
to convert to life-of-mine supply. The state-owned Beijing Institute of Mining and 
Metallurgy is a major stakeholder (27%) in Beijing Easpring. Clean TeQ Holdings aims 




4. NICO: This is a development-stage project in Canada’s Northwest Territories 100% 
owned by Fortune Minerals Corp. The project is planned to be a vertically integrated 
primary cobalt mine, with a refinery near Saskatoon, Canada, to refine concentrate to 
battery-grade. In August 2017, the company announced an update to its 2014 feasibility 
report, which is currently being done by Hatch Ltd. and Micon International Ltd. and 
should be published in 2018. The company is currently pursuing offtake agreements and 
financing opportunities to develop the project.
30
 
5. Northmet: This is an advanced exploration project in Minnesota, USA wholly owned by 
Polymet Mining Corp. The company is currently securing permits and financing for 
project development. While the company is in a relatively weak financial position, the 
company claims to be taking steps to strengthen its position. Northmet has a fairly sizable 
reserve base of 249 million tonnes with an average cobalt grade of 0.01%.  
 
Other notable cobalt exploration projects set to come online in the next two years are: Weda Bay 
in Indonesia jointly owned by Eramet and Tsingshan group; Niwest in Australia owned by GME 
Resources; Cobre Panama in Panama owned by First Quantum Minerals; Kalgoorlie Nickel in 
Australia owned by Ardea Resources; Ban Phuc Extension in Vietnam 90% owned by Asian 
Mineral Resources; and Kipoi Central in the DRC 60% owned by Tiger Resources.  
 
Given that mineral reserves data is constantly changing as new deposits are developed and/or 
economic conditions become more or less favorable, it is difficult to determine how many 
mineral reserves remain unexploited. There is also great potential to tap high concentration 
cobalt reserves once seabed mining becomes economically viable and socially more acceptable.
31
 
However, the US Geological Survey (USGS) provides an industry-respected baseline estimate 
from which we can infer results. According the USGS cobalt mineral survey (2017), world total 
                                                     
27 A mineral grade is the concentration or percentage of target mineral in the ore. It is a helpful feature to evaluate the overall 
quality of a deposit. 
28 Katanga Mining Ltd. NI 43-101 Report, March, 2017: http://www.katangamining.com/~/media/Files/K/Katanga-mining-
v2/operations/reportsoperational/technical-report-march-2017.pdf  
29 Clean TeQ Holdings July 2017 Investor Presentation: http://www.cleanteq.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/Investor-
Presentation-July-2017-Final.pdf  
30 Fortune Minerals Press Release, August 8, 2017: http://www.fortuneminerals.com/news/press-releases/press-release-
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mine production and reserves of cobalt in 2016 were approximately 123,000 and 7,000,000 
tonnes respectively. Based on projected production rates of the advanced exploration projects 
surveyed by CCSI, an estimated amount of 10,000 – 12,000 tonnes of cobalt will be coming 
online in the next five years.  
 
As discussed above, several experts forecast a strong long-term battery demand growth. 
Assuming cobalt production from existing mines remains constant and the addition cobalt from 
advanced stage projects by 2020 occurs as projected, there is going to be a significant market 
deficit. Figure 6 shows that this deficit persists even when taking into account increasing output 
from existing projects and recycling.  
 
Foreseeable Technological Breakthroughs that May Disrupt Cobalt Dependency 
 
In this context, the most important question is whether there are any replacement technologies 
that may disrupt cobalt demand.  Alternative materials used to replace critical materials must be 
process-compatible with the materials they replace, meaning they should enable the technology 
to complete the same task using the same process rather than forcing the technology to be 
redesigned to fit the new material.  As discussed above, currently, cobalt is essential to modern 
nickel-cadmium, nickel-metal hydride, and lithium-ion batteries used in EVs. Lithium cobalt 
cathodes have the highest storage capacity efficiency
32
 and use significant amounts of cobalt. 
Other lithium-ion batteries that use less (or zero) cobalt face a number of challenges to industry 
adoption, including technical feasibility, material scarcity, separation processing capability, and 
replicability of the unique properties of cobalt (i.e. conductivity and heat strength).
3334
 In 
Volkswagen’s recent tender, for example, there is a presumption that cobalt usage per unit 
battery may decrease over time within an initial usage ratio of nickel:cobalt:manganese at 6:2:2 
which could change to 8:1:1 noting the relative scarcity of cobalt and manganese as compared to 
nickel. However, EV car-makers have explained that this ratio minimizing cobalt will decrease 
the battery lifespans.
35
 Moreover, nickel reserves themselves are also few and far between, being 
historically dominated by Russia, Canada, Indonesia, the Philippines, and New Caledonia. 
 
Zinc-based batteries represent one of the strongest prospects being explored as a realistic 
alternative to cobalt-reliant options (illustrated in the table below). Nickel-zinc battery 
technology has existed since the early 1900s, but is currently being developed for use in EVs by 
a California-based company EnZinc. EnZinc’s battery is expected to be market-ready by 2019.36 
Other companies are pursuing zinc-air battery technology, which oxidizes zinc with oxygen from 
the air to create low cost, high energy density batteries. Zinc-air batteries have existed for many 
years, but a recent breakthrough by the University of Sydney and University of Singapore 
enhancing the ability of zinc-air batteries to recharge effectively has made this battery potentially 
viable for EVs and other purposes. And because zinc is much more plentiful than cobalt, 
                                                     
32 Jack Lifton. Personal Interview. (2017) 
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34 See Appendix D for an overview of the various battery technologies. 
35 Deign, “The Truth About the Cobalt Crisis: It's Not a Crisis, Yet”, October 18, 2017 
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cheaper, and available in large quantities in many countries throughout the world, zinc-based 
battery technology is a highly attractive alternative to cobalt-reliant batteries.
37
 This technology 
is however not in use currently and remains unproven. See Table 2 for a comparison of cobalt-
based batteries as compared to zinc-based batteries.  
 
Table 2: Cobalt/Zinc Comparison Table 
Material 
Cobalt (in Nickel-cadmium 
batteries, Nickel-metal hybrid 
batteries, and Lithium-ion 
batteries) 




 High strength 
 High magnetic strength 
 High energy density 
 High energy density 
 Accessibility and diversity of source 
supply 
 Inexpensive 
 No fire risk 
 Lighter weight than Li-ion battery 
Properties 
(Con) 
 Relatively low discharge 
current 
 Fire risk 
 Uncertain future supply 
 Recharging/discharging concerns 






 Ethical supply chain 
concerns 
 Supply quantity/availability 
 Increasing costs in the future 
 High availability 
 Low price 
 Stable supply 
 Unproven technology 
Likelihood of 
Adoption/Use  
 High (currently used)  Medium/High 
 
Recycling provides another alternative helping to reduce the dependence of cobalt in batteries. 
Recycling and repurposing cobalt increases the amount of material available for use, which 
increases global supply and reduces immediate need for alternative materials and technologies. 
Currently, cobalt is salvaged from batteries through multiple highly-complex chemical processes 
which include hazardous materials, extreme temperatures, and high labor intensity. Because 
processes are not environmentally friendly, strict government regulation is also a hurdle in many 
countries. In addition, cobalt is often used in small quantities as part of intricate technology 
products, making it difficult to recover. To date, cobalt recycling is not yet a profitable business 
model on a large scale. However, because cobalt does not break down during its use, it is fully 
recyclable. If processing technologies become less expensive cobalt recycling could become 
economically viable and a consistent source of cobalt for the global market. Given China’s early 
progress on the circular economy
38
 and its looming exponential need to recycle battery out of its 
nascent but booming electric vehicle market (see figure 10), China might hold the promise of 
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Thus, notwithstanding the evolution of battery technology, the complete replacement or 
eradication of the use of cobalt seems unlikely. There is likely to be some amount of substitution, 
but the effects on the demand for cobalt are not anticipated to be significant due to the mechanics 
and the chemistry of batteries.
41 
Moreover, while recycling technologies are progressing, they do 
not eliminate the need to mine additional cobalt supplies for the time being. This working 
assumption is guiding the central argument of this paper: there is an urgent need to come up with 
a public private partnership to enable responsible mining of cobalt at a high enough scale to 
satisfy the needs of green technologies. 
4. Investment Solutions Moving Forward 
 
Given the supply constraints and that no foreseeable technological breakthrough will 
significantly reduce global dependency on cobalt, companies are choosing to enter into 
partnerships and/or purchase ownership in foreign mining operations as a way to secure access to 
critical materials. Chinese companies recently purchased a controlling stake in the world’s 
largest cobalt mine located in the Democratic Republic of Congo, (and have also entered into 
agreements in South America to gain access to the lithium reserves there). Germany has done the 
                                                     
39 Zeng, X. and Li, J., 2015. On the sustainability of cobalt utilization in China. Resources, Conservation and Recycling, 104, 
pp.12-18. 
40 Echo Huang, “China’s booming electric vehicle market is about to run into a mountain of battery waste,” Quartz.com, 
September 28, 2017 
41 Battery University, Summary Table of Future Batteries, July 21, 2016, 
 http://batteryuniversity.com/learn/article/bu_218_summary_table_of_future_batteries (accessed November, 2017) 
19 
 
same in Bolivia, using foreign direct investment as a tool to secure its supply of critical materials 
needed for its green technology growth.
42
 As discussed above, American EV company Tesla has 
claimed it will source 100% of its cobalt from North America, but skeptics suggest that existing 
cobalt production from this region of the world will not be enough to supply Tesla’s ambitious 
rollout of 500,000 EVs annually by 2018.
43
 The company may soon be forced to renege on this 
promise and partner with other cobalt miners, or find other ways to obtain cobalt. In September 
2017, Volkswagen announced a tendering process for a $59 billion contract to secure enough 
cobalt supplies to meet the demand of 150 gigawatt-hours of lithium-ion battery storage by 2025. 
In October 2017, the firm announced a failure to find a supplier that would guarantee more than 
four years of cobalt at a fixed price.
44
 These examples highlight the need for a more systematic 
approach to address cobalt supply going forward.   
 
Smart Mineral Enterprise Development for Green Technologies 
 
As this report has shown, there is a need for a more efficient mechanism for linking triggers of 
mineral demand with sources of supply. Given the structural constraints in the mining industry 
and the delays from mine discovery to market delivery of products, a smarter system of mineral 
enterprise development is needed. We use the word “smart” analogously to how it is used in the 
context of smart electricity grids which are dynamic systems allowing for rapid feedback loops 
between demand centers to a devolved set of supply sources. Such a system is geared towards 
greater resilience and minimal wastage. For smart electricity grids, computer algorithms and 
digital interfaces can control the flow of information to maximize efficiency. For a smart mineral 
enterprise development system, there is need for an organizational structure to manage this flow 
of information.  
 
Without such a “smart” approach, there is major risk associated with the possibility that one 
country can flood the market and drop prices of critical minerals, running new and junior 
companies out of business. For example, Chinese industry is organizing its supply chains in a 
way to ensure that it does not face a shortage of the supply of raw materials. Since China is a 
centrally planned economy, its strength lies in its government's push for investments in mining 
both domestically and overseas. China has identified a few critical raw materials to focus on, and 
uses a hybrid financing-and-government framework to ensure their ample supply. It also has a 
range of corporate investment vehicles which include buying minority and majority stakes in 
foreign mining companies from state owned enterprises. All these approaches are ultimately 





Resource poor, but high income manufacturing countries that have invested strategically through 
                                                     
42 Alex Emery, “Germany's K-Utec signs Bolivian lithium plant contract”, BNAmericas, August 18, 2015, 
https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/mining/germanys-k-utec-signs-bolivian-lithium-plant-contract1/ (accessed March 15, 
2017). 
43 Gandon, “No cobalt, no Tesla?” January 2017  
44 Jason Deign, “The Truth About the Cobalt Crisis: It's Not a Crisis, Yet”, Green Tech Media, October 18, 2017, 
https://www.greentechmedia.com/amp/article/the-truth-about-the-cobalt-crisis. (accessed October 25, 2017) 
45 Jill Shankelman. Chinese Oil and Mining Companies and the Governance of Resource Wealth. Washington DC: Woodrow 
Wilson Center, 2009. 
20 
 
a public-private partnership model in mineral supply chains most notably are Japan and Republic 
of Korea. Both these countries have engaged public sector entities that assist with mineral supply 
assurance. In Japan there are two organizations which work closely to ensure mineral supply - 
one from the geological and scientific side (the Japanese Oil, Gas and Metals National 
Corporation or JOGMEC) and the other on the finance side (The Japanese Bank for International 
Cooperation). In the Korean case, there is a state-owned exploration and development company 
called Korea Resources Corporation (KORES) which has in its stated mission the support of the 




In the aforementioned Asian countries, the government works with the financial sector (or in the 
case of China, controls and dictates actions of the financial sector) to facilitate and ensure capital 
investment to the technology metals industry.
47
 This, in turn, enables increased production by the 
industry to achieve adequate supply of these critical materials. As a result of these PPPs, the 
majority of the world’s technology metals and materials are produced by entities owned or 
operated for the benefit of these Asian countries.  
 
Meanwhile, the United States, Canadian, and EU governments do not directly invest in mining or 
have public-private partnership frameworks in place for such investment. Instead, they rely 
largely on the private sector to invest unilaterally, based on the belief that the power of the free 
market will balance the supply and demand needs of their industry. However, the dependence of 
modern economic systems on critical metals requires us to consider a hybrid approach which 
combines the innovative impulse of private enterprise with the strategic long-term view that 
public sector institutions can provide. While the United States has several National Labs and has 
also supported organizations such as the Critical Materials Institute (CMI) through university and 
private sector partnerships, the mandate of such efforts is largely limited to research rather than 
project development.  
 
Figure 11 shows our suggested hybrid or “Smart Mineral Enterprise Development” approach, 
which can be applied to critical metals planning. The diagram uses flowchart nomenclature with 
inputs, outputs, decision and process nodes.  
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The diagram lays out the government and private sector roles as highlighted by the green and 
orange outlines of the action boxes. The Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), which constitute the 
backbone of SMED, are noted in black outline. Material service delivery is considered from both 
mined and recycled sources. The calibration of supply (mined and recycled firm sources) and 
demand (green technology firms) is maintained through a stockpile. Core to the “smart” element 
of SMED is the system of communication between supply and demand centers as well as the 
research and development community. The timing of the signals between technological demand 
and supply constraints can be much better coordinated to induce entrepreneurial activity in a 
more proactive way than is usually the case in ad hoc entrepreneurial systems. The SMED 
approach also considers environmental and social risk safeguards linked to capital markets and 
stock exchanges to ensure that a more sustainable outcome from junior high risk/high reward 
firms can also be maintained. This can be undertaken through existing certification schemes that 
ensure that environmental and social risks are not compromised in the rush to encourage 
entrepreneurship. 
 
The SMED approach can be actualized through a range of existing organizations that are 
assigned specific tasks within the framework with the goal to connect green technology firms 
with mineral enterprises through a series of efficiency and risk management steps. We have 
developed this framework with the anticipation of a rise in recycling technologies and noted the 
importance of a circular economy approach to resource planning. A strategic stockpile of key 
metals that is managed at a global scale through international agreement would also allow for 






















































future shortages. During the Cold War, countries regularly kept metal stockpiles. This has been 




The Intergovernmental Forum on Mining Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF) could 
potentially be a coordinating body for this effort. This forum, which was originally motivated by 
the Canadian government to improve governance of mining countries in order to minimize risk 
for Canadian miners, now has a membership of over 60 mining countries. It could be further 
empowered through an international protocol which allows for the sharing of valuable geological 
and scrap availability data. Existing certification systems such as those developed by the OECD 
could be harnessed for the environmental and social risk certification component of the 
framework (see Box 2). 
 
Box 2:  Responsible Cobalt Initiative for DRC 
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce for Metals, Minerals & Chemicals Importers & Exporters 
(CCCMC) in partnership and cooperation with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) Due Diligence Guidance, launched the Responsible Cobalt Initiative 
(RCI) that provides member companies with steps to take to identify and address potential 
adverse impacts associated with their activities or relationships. RCI was launched in response to 
human rights abuses and egregious health and safety conditions in some artisanal cobalt mines in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. As a priority, the RCI intends to tackle issues of the 
worst forms of child labor.  
 
Launched in November 2016, the RCI strives to bring about a collective response to social and 
environmental risks in the cobalt supply chain. The initiative promotes the responsible sourcing 
and use of cobalt in all forms and aims to improve the lives of children and adults who mine 
cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
 
Members of the initiative pledge to follow OECD Due Diligence Guidance on Responsible 
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas, which calls for 
companies to trace how cobalt is being extracted, transported, manufactured and sold. The 
OECD provides clear, practical guidance for companies to ensure they do not contribute to 
conflict or human rights abuses through their mining activities through a five-step risk-based due 
diligence process. This applies to all companies in the mineral supply chain that could potentially 
use minerals from conflict affected or high-risk areas, including pre-production exploration 
activities. Its members currently include Apple Inc., Beijing Easpring Material Technology 
Co.,Ltd., HP Inc., Huawei Device Co.,Ltd., L&F, Samsung SDI, Sony Corporation, Tianjin 
B&M Science and Technology Joint-Stock Co., Ltd., Zhejiang Huayou Cobalt Co., Ltd., and 
First Cobalt Corp. Companies will work together, in coordination with the Government of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, to develop and begin implementation of an action plan 
during the next 12 months.
49 
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A prototype for such a public-private partnership for more effective interface between mineral 
suppliers and manufacturers of batteries has recently been established by the World Economic 
Forum (Box 3). Box 3 also features the effort of the Cobalt Institute, a non-profit trade institution 
seeking more coordination, knowledge and sustainability in the cobalt industry. 
 
Box 3: Global Battery Alliance Initiative: An Example of a Public-Private Enterprise Effort; and 
The Cobalt Institute: An Example Of Coordination Mechanism Across The Cobalt Value Chain  
The Global Battery Alliance Initiative is a new initiative that was publicly launched in 
September 2017. The alliance was formed with the vision to develop an inclusive, innovative and 
sustainable battery value chain to power the Fourth Industrial Revolution. Its mission is to 
catalyze, accelerate and scale up public-private action to achieve this vision. The main objectives 
are to: 1) Mobilize a global alliance of principals supporting the vision, 2) Catalyze action 
towards specific pillars of work under the alliance that addresses social, environmental and 
innovation challenges, and 3) Build a global movement to replicate these learnings in other 
global value chains. 
 
The working model proposed by the alliance is one of a global catalyst and accelerator.  
● The alliance accelerates or catalyzes actions towards specific pillars of work.  
● This action is facilitated through partnerships on a country or cross-country level. 
● The partnerships involve and leverage several critical local stakeholders. 
● Comparable initiatives developed by the World Economic Forum include the Tropical 
Forest Alliance 2020, the Water Resources Group 2030, and the Grow Africa Partnership 
 
A few of the emerging areas the alliance seeks to work on are: 
● Responsible sourcing of raw materials, addressing challenges such as child labour, health 
and safety hazards in the battery value chain. 
● Moving towards a circular economy for batteries, to address the principal challenges of 
battery recycling and life cycle sustainability across all chemistries and regions. 
● Unlocking innovation across the value chain, for example by using emerging 
technologies (e.g. blockchain) to support a more traceable, smart and innovative value 
chain. 
● Working towards supportive policy principles and approaches across relevant countries, 
country groupings (e.g. G20) and regions 
 
The Cobalt Institute 
The Cobalt Institute (CI) is a non-profit trade association composed of producers, users, 
recyclers, and traders of cobalt, promoting the sustainable and responsible production and use of 
cobalt. They act as a knowledge centre for governments, agencies, industry, the media and the 
public, and represent the voice of the cobalt industry on cobalt related health, safety, and 
environmental issues. They promote co-operation between members, especially on issues of the 
environment and human health, and provide a mechanism for the development of independent 
                                                                                                                                                                           




information concerning the resources, production and safe use of cobalt.
50 
 
The International Legal Framework and SMED 
 
The international legal framework could also support the implementation of SMED in different 
ways. International trade and investments are governed by the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), and Bilateral and Multilateral Investment Treaties 
(BITs). This framework supersedes the domestic legal frameworks.  Following intense treaty-
signing activity during the 1990s, the number of investment treaties and agreements jumped from 
under 400 in 1990 to over 3,300 in 2015.
51
  There are several ways in which the framework 
could be adapted to support the implementation of SMED. 
 
Trade: 
There is an ongoing negotiation at the WTO to eliminate tariffs for “environmental goods.” In 
January 2016, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) promoting free trade in Asia-
Pacific took the lead and signed such an agreement that includes a list of 54 goods linked to 
renewable energies and energy efficiencies.
52
 If critical minerals qualify as environmental goods, 
WTO and related free trade agreements would ensure that trade barriers do not stand as an 
obstacle to the implementation of SMED. Moreover, WTO has been criticized for banning green 
subsidies as it does for any specific subsidy.
53
 There are suggestions that these subsidies should 
be “non- actionable” (not subject to countervailing measures) given their potential to contribute 
to the improvement of public welfare.
54
 In case the WTO reinstates green subsidies as being non-
actionable, these should encompass those involved in the implementation of SMED. 
Another recent development that could encompass green technology mineral promotion and 
information exchange among trading partners to support SMED is Europe’s chapter on Trade 
and Sustainable Development (TSD) that the EU intends to include in its FTAs. A recent FTA 
signed with Singapore includes the following relevant articles:  
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Article 13.1: …“The Parties recognise that economic development, social development 
and environmental protection are interdependent and mutually reinforcing components 
of sustainable development. They underline the benefit of cooperation on trade-related 
social and environmental issues as part of a global approach to trade and sustainable 
development.”55…, 
and 
Article 13.10: “Cooperation on Environmental Aspects in the Context of Trade and 
Sustainable Development: 
 
The Parties recognise the importance of working together on trade-related aspects of 
environmental policies in order to achieve the objectives of this Agreement. The Parties 
may initiate cooperative activities of mutual benefit in areas including but not limited to: 
 
(a) exchange of views on the positive and negative impacts of this Agreement on 
environmental aspects of sustainable development and ways to enhance, prevent or 
mitigate them, taking into account sustainability impact assessments carried out by either 
or both Parties; 
(b) cooperation in international fora addressing environmental aspects of trade and 
sustainable development, including in particular at the WTO, under the United Nations 
Environment Programme and under multilateral environmental agreements; 
(c) cooperation with a view to promoting the ratification and effective implementation of 
multilateral environmental agreements with relevance to trade; 
(d) information exchange and cooperation on private and public certification and 
labelling schemes including eco-labelling, and green public procurement; 
(e) exchange of views on the trade impact of environmental regulations, norms and 
standards; 
(f) cooperation on trade-related aspects of the current and future international climate 
change regime, including ways to address adverse effects of trade on climate, as well as 
means to promote low-carbon technologies and energy efficiency; 
(g) cooperation on trade related aspects of multilateral environmental agreements, 
including customs cooperation; 
(h) sustainable forest management to encourage effective measures for certification of 
sustainably produced timber; 
(i) exchange of views on the relationship between multilateral environmental agreements 
and international trade rules; 
(j) exchange of views on the liberalisation of environmental goods and services; and 
(k) exchange of views regarding conservation and management of the living marine 
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Existing TSD chapters in EU trade agreements include a comprehensive set of binding 
provisions, rooted in multilateral standards, notably the International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
conventions and Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). The institutional structure 
operationalizing EU TSD chapters grants civil society a key advisory role. Civil society groups 
participate in the monitoring of the FTA implementation through platforms on the side of each 
FTA partner and through Joint Platforms bringing together civil society organisations from both 
FTA partners. TSD provisions are binding and subject to a different dispute settlement 
mechanism, as it grants an explicit role to civil society and international organizations. This 
mechanism does not include sanctions and enforcement has been limited, which is an area that is 
currently being reviewed.
 57
 Such mechanism could provide a useful framework for countries to 
cooperate in order to promote the implementation of SMED at the international level.  
Investment:  
BITs could also be adapted to support the implementation of SMED. BITs are signed between 
states and impose obligations and restrictions on countries regarding their treatment of foreign 
investors. BITs protect investors from government action that would harm the right and interests 
of foreign investors that seek to invest or who have invested in a host country. When a state signs 
a treaty, “a state’s ability to adopt, revise, repeal, and enforce laws and policies that affect 
foreign investors or investments is made subject to the state’s obligations under that treaty.”58 A 
breach of these obligations due to the promulgation of a law that would negatively affect an 
investment can trigger an arbitration procedure whereby a foreign investor covered by the BIT 
takes the state to arbitration in an international tribunal. A BIT supporting critical mineral 
development could include a chapter focused on critical minerals that makes the investment 
conditional on the implementation of a specified SMED process that allocates the 
implementation responsibility to the state. Furthermore, the chapter could include protections for 
the investor such as uncompensated nationalization, denial of justice and export restrictions. This 
would be particularly relevant to the implementation of SMED at the global level since export 
restrictions could disrupt the supply of critical minerals. 
 
It should be noted BITs have often been used abusively by foreign investors that have been 
taking governments to court for imposing environmental and social protection mechanisms. 
Many of these investor-state disputes are related to extractive industry investments (E.g.
59
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Glamis Gold, Ltd. vs United States and Lone Pine Resources Inc. vs Canada for more stringent 
environmental regulations”) 60.  
 
As such, much care should be taken to draft SMED related investor protection clauses and 
governments should “carefully define the scope and content of these agreements in order to 
protect their ability to regulate in the public interest.”61 Thus suggesting how BITs could be used 
in favor of SMED is a delicate exercise. If investments in critical minerals ought to be protected 
by BITs in particular, the state’s right to legislate to limit the social and environmental harm of 
an investment in critical minerals should be equally protected. The right to arbitration should not 
be granted if a foreign investor is in breach of the IFC performance standards for instance. To 
further limit the potential for abuse of BITs by investors, it is recommended that the dispute 
settlement can only be triggered by a state complaint, as is currently the case under the WTO and 
trade chapters of the FTAs. 
 
Beyond the existing legal framework governing investment and trade, a recent development in 
the field of international environmental governance could be used for implementing the SMED 
approach: in June 2017 world leaders agreed to collaborate on putting forth a Global Pact for the 
Environment. The proposal foresees a universal, international umbrella binding document 
synthesizing and harmonizing the principles outlined in the Rio Declaration, the Earth Charter, 
the World Charter for Nature, and other instruments shaping environmental governance.
62
 This 
Global Pact for the Environment could promote the principles of SMED while ensuring that any 
critical mineral exploitation would comply with the international environmental and social 
standards.  
6. Conclusion and Further Research 
 
While there has been increasing focus on critical materials for green technologies, the 
relationship between public and private sectors to spur appropriate investments to meet the 
lurking supply crunch has thus far been neglected. Using the example of cobalt, which is a key 
input to a variety of green technology products with limited substitutability, we show that the 
private sector, mainly composed of mining entrepreneurs, is currently not investing sufficiently 
in exploration and development to bring enough projects on stream to satisfy the demand 
necessary for the energy transition. This is because the incentive mechanisms are not supporting 
timely private sector investments in that space. Given the public good nature of green 
technologies, there is a strong case for government intervention to support the transition. While 
in many countries policies are in place to support and subsidize the roll-out of renewable 
                                                                                                                                                                           
research and development (e.g., Mobil Investments Canada, Inc. v. Canada)”, etc. (source: Coleman and Johnson, “International 
Investment Law and the Extractive Industries Sector”. Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment. January 12, 2016) 
60 Coleman and Johnson, “International Investment Law and the Extractive Industries Sector”. Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment. January 12, 2016. 
61 Coleman and Johnson, “International Investment Law and the Extractive Industries Sector”. Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment. January 12, 2016. 
62 “French initiative to create global environment pact deserves support, says Secretary-General”. UN News Centre. 17, 
September, 2017, Available at http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2017/09/french-initiative-to-create-global-
environment-pact-deserves-support-says-secretary-general/. (accessed November 2017) 
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energies and green transport solutions, these interventions will fall short if not paired with 
policies that help guarantee the supply of key inputs, such as cobalt. Several Asian countries are 
utilizing PPP frameworks in critical materials mining with great success, but no such system 
exists in the US, within the EU, or at an international level. We therefore propose a framework 
which enables the public sector and research community to play an essential role in facilitating 
an efficient and “smart” system for managing enterprise development, which mimics the 
efficiency of an eponymous “Smart Grid” system for energy. Stock exchanges, which host small 
mining and recycling companies, must also be more actively engaged in this process to monitor 
any environmental and social risks of listed companies.  
 
Forecasts of supply and demand are highly malleable and more refined models are needed to link 
technological developments, geological discoveries and consumer choice. This should be an area 
of further research governments should be more involved in primary data recording and 
acquisition. So far the criticality of minerals is being highlighted at national or regional levels, 
similar to the latest list of critical metals published by the U.S. Geological Survey on February 
16, 2018.
63
 While such lists are useful, there is a need for a more global approach to this 
phenomenon to address global environmental concerns such as climate change. The international 
governance system could help with the promotion of investments in critical minerals. While we 
are conscious of continuous alternative material research in all criticality cases, our broader goal 
is the development of a system that supports any new material needs of ever-changing 
technologies that supports the energy transition. Ultimately, international treaties such as the 
Paris Agreement, which set targets for particular environmental goals, will need to pay more 
attention to material needs and mechanisms for ensuring any embedded targets can be met.   
                                                     





Appendix A: Survey Methodology 
 
Data compilation 
We drew up a list of publicly-traded mining and exploration companies on stock exchanges in 
Canada, Australia, USA, Europe, Tokyo, and Hong Kong. These exchanges were selected for the 
similarity in their listing rules to allow for greater uniformity in the sort of company data 
collected. Also, given the deposit types of naturally occurring cobalt compounds, the selection 
was constrained to companies with some combination of nickel, copper, and occasionally gold as 
the primary mineral, with secondary targets for cobalt.  
 
Next, we collected technical data on cobalt projects. This data comprised of: the size and 
location of the mineral resource and reserve; the grade or concentration of the target mineral; and 
the status of exploration at the project site. The sources for this data include NI 43-101 technical 
reports, announcements on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), news and media reports, and 
descriptions on company websites. The survey required technical data that is compliant with 
JORC 2012 and NI 43-101 standards as a minimum (see box 4 for more information on the 
mineral investment process). It was important that all the information collected on the companies 
and projects are publicly available to allow for easier verification and data reconciliation. In 
total, 67 projects were surveyed. The database structure used for the survey was: 
 
1. Exchange (name of stock exchange on which the company is listed) 
2. Company (name of company) 
3. HQ Location 
4. HQ Region 
5. Project (name of project) 
6. Ownership (% ownership of project for company listed) 
7. Country 
8. State 
9. Latitudinal and longitudinal data (for mapping purposes) 
10. Status (stage of project exploration) 
11. Deposit or Exploration type 
12. Grade (in %) and tonnage (in million or thousand M.tonnes) for Proven & Probable 
Reserves (P&P) 
13. Grade (in %) and tonnage (in million or thousand M.tonnes)for Indicated & Measured 
Resources (I & M) 
14. Grade (in %) and tonnage (in million or thousand M.tonnes) for Inferred Resources 
15. NI 43-101 report (yes/no) 
16. Notes relevant to project or company 
17. Additional financial information 
 
A column on exploration type was included to note which projects were brownfield or greenfield 
exploration for further analysis. 
 
Data Analysis and Reconciliation 
To begin the spatial distribution analysis, location data for each project was collected and 
plotted. Oftentimes, this data was given as longitudinal and latitudinal data included in project 
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descriptions on company websites, presentations, or in technical reports. Where longitudinal and 
latitudinal data was not provided, as in initial or early exploration projects where no technical 
reports had been prepared, a central location point was inferred from project descriptions. As an 
example, a project described as 100 km southwest (SW) of a town or city was estimated to be at 
any point 100 km SW of said city, and within 50km radius of said point. This was done so as to 
allow projects in initial and early exploration stages to be plotted regardless of exactness of the 
locational data.  
 
In determining a project’s stage of exploration, the following key was developed with guidance 
from the Generalized Model of Resource Development (see Appendix B):  
 
 Initial Exploration: At most, land staked and property claims filed, reconnaissance and 
data compilation underway. 
 Early Exploration: At least inferred resources have been defined. Anomaly surveys 
underway. Might include a scoping report, pre-feasibility report, or preliminary economic 
assessment. 
 Advanced Exploration:  At most, proven and probable reserves have been defined. 
Might include a scoping, pre-feasibility, or feasibility report. 
 Development: At least proven and probable reserves have been defined. Company 
announcements and news reports of permitting, construction, offtake agreements, and 
other development activities at project site. 
 
It was important that information reported on company websites were consistent with company 
announcements on security or stock exchanges, report publications in security exchange 
databases such as SEDAR, and news in the media. 
 
Limitations of survey 
Three factors constrain the survey of projects: 
1. Time limitations: Project or company announcements that have not been updated after 
three fiscal quarters (nine months) are excluded in the final ranking of companies. This is 
to ensure public information on the projects are current. As an example, Metorex, a 
company traded on the Hong Kong stock exchange, claims their Musonoi project in the 
DRC is in the advanced exploration stage with a relatively sizable resource base. 
However, the company’s latest publicly available annual report is from 2010 and the last 
project update on their website is from 2014. As a result, the project was not included in 
final rankings for advanced cobalt projects. 
2. Company type: Only publicly-traded companies were surveyed due to greater 
transparency and availability of information on these companies. Security and stock 
exchanges mandate companies adhere to certain rules. As a result, private companies 
with lithium and cobalt exploration projects were excluded. We also only included 
companies traded on exchanges in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Europe in 
the final analysis due to greater uniformity in listing rules on their respective exchanges. 
3. Regional project density: The survey required a minimum of two exploration projects in a 
geographic region to be noted as significant. As an example, Birimian Limited’s 
Goulmina project in Mali was not charted as it is the only lithium exploration project in 
the MENA and African regions with JORC-compliant resources.  
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Box 4:  Mineral Investment Process 
Investing in a mining project involves analyzing a unique mix of geological, technical, 
economic, social, and environmental risks at nearly every stage of the project. As with any other 
investment, it is important investors do their due diligence when deciding on a project.  The 
process for assessing the potential success of a mining project rests primarily on three factors: 
the technical components of the project, the knowledge and expertise of the project directors, and 
the region in which the project is located
64
. These three factors are known colloquially in the 
mining industry as the three Ps – project, people, and place – and they factor in many of the risks 
associated with developing a mining deposit. 
 
A robust mineral deposit is the foundation on which a good project is built, and the defining 
metrics of a mineral deposit are its grade, tonnage, and metallurgy. The grade of a deposit is the 
percentage or concentration of valuable mineral in the ore, while tonnage refers to the volumetric 
size of the deposit. A deposit with above average grade and tonnage has a higher chance of 
making it to production, all things being equal. In addition to the tonnage and grade, the 
technical viability of the metallurgical methods proposed should also be assessed, as incorrect 
metallurgical analyses can lead to cost overruns and can betray a lack of specialized knowledge 
in the team.  
 
This geological and technical information is typically sourced from technical reports or official 
resource estimates, which are published by companies at certain project milestones. When 
assessing a project, it is important that the exploration results and mineral estimates published by 
the company are compliant with standardized mineral reporting rules and guidelines such as the 
JORC Code (2012), NI 43-101, and SAMREC. Resource estimates not compliant with reporting 
standards are not reliable and will incur more risk for the investor if used as the basis for 
analyses. 
 
Finally, one should assess the category of the mineral deposit. As discussed above, project risk 
varies with the resource classification and stage of development. A mineral deposit is classified 
as a resource when primarily geological risks have been considered, and as a reserve when 
economic risks (factoring in legal, political, social and environmental circumstances) have been 
considered in addition. The geological risk associated with the project reduces with more tests 
and delineation, while economic risk reduces with studies analyzing the effects that commodity 
price, costs, and other economic parameters have on the viability of developing the project. 
  
                                                     
64 David Talbot: Interview (April, 2017) 
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Appendix B: Cobalt Companies Examined For Analysis 
 




Appendix C: Lithium survey results 
Figure 12 (left): Distribution stage of lithium exploration projects;  
Figure 13 (right): Development stage of lithium exploration projects 
 
 
The spatial analysis shows that lithium exploration projects are largely concentrated in North and 
South America. Of the 92 lithium exploration projects surveyed, 12 projects are in the advanced 
exploration to development stages and are concentrated in Argentina, Canada, and Western 
Australia. The clear majority of lithium exploration projects are in the initial exploration stages 
where even inferred mineral resources have not been defined.  
 
Noteworthy Lithium Exploration Projects: 
 
1. Greenbushes Expansion: Jointly owned by Albemarle (49%) and Tianqi Lithium (51%) 
via Talison Lithium, the company announced plans to double production at their 
Greenbushes mine by early 2019. Already the world’s largest lithium mine, yearly 
capacity at Greenbushes will reach 1.34 million tonnes of lithium concentrate, 
approximately 180,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate, by 2019 according to the company. 
Greenbushes is an open-pit spodumene mine located in Western Australia.  
2. Pilgangoora: The development-stage project is in the Pilgangoora area in Western 
Australia. Wholly-owned by Altura Mining, the project is planned to be an open-pit 
spodumene mine commencing production in the first quarter of 2018. As of September 
2017, Altura Mining has completed preliminary offtake agreements for 100% of 
production with Optimum Nano and Lionergy, two major Chinese battery-grade lithium 
manufacturers.
65
 Construction of the project is fully funded and at 50% completion.
66
 
3. Cauchari-Olaroz: This development-stage project located in Argentina is operated as a 
50/50 joint venture between Lithium Americas and the Sociedad Quimica y Minera de 
Chile (SQM). Lithium Americas entered a financing deal with GFL International Co. 
Ltd.
67
 and BCP Innovation Pte Ltd.
68
 to fund Lithium Americas’ share of capital costs. 
The project is planned to be completed in early 2019 with a production capacity of 
                                                     
65 OptimumNano is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Shaanxi J&R Optimum Energy listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. 
Lionergy owns a vertically integrated lithium exploration, development, sales and distribution for lithium-ion batteries. 
66 Altura Mining Investor Update 2017: https://alturamining.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/1710794.pdf  
67 GFL International Co. Ltd. Is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Jiangxi Gangfeng Lithium Co. Ltd 
68 BCP Innovation Pte Ltd. is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Bangchak Corporation Public Company Ltd. 
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25,000 tonnes of lithium carbonate annually.  
4. Whabouchi: Whabouchi Lithium is a development-stage hard rock project located in 
Quebec, Canada. As of September 2017, the company has met feed production targets for 
the Phase 1 Plant in Shawinigan, Quebec. The company aims to be a fully integrated 
lithium producer processing lithium concentrate into battery-grade lithium compounds at 
their Shawinigan plant through a patented process. The project has an open-pit mineral 
profile of 20 million tonnes of proven and probable reserves at an average grade of 1.53% 
and is projected to expand to an underground mine. Commercial production is expected 
by early to mid 2018. 
5. Sonora Lithium: Jointly owned by Bacanora Minerals (70%) and Cadence Minerals 
(30%), the lithium-clay project is located about 190km north of Hermosillo, Mexico and 
is in the advanced exploration stage. In June 2017 the company entered an offtake 
contract with Hanwa Co. Ltd.
69
 for 70% to 100% of planned production in Phase 1, 
conditional on an initial 10% equity interest in Bacanora.  
 
Other advanced projects expected to come online in the next two years are: Jadar in Serbia by 
Rio Tinto; Planta Salar in Chile owned by Rockwood Lithium; Salar de Centenario in Argentina 
owned by Eramet; Sal de Vida in Argentina owned by Galaxy Resources Ltd.; Sal de Los 
Angeles in Argentina owned by Lithium X Energy Corp.; Tres Quebradas in Argentina owned 
by Neo Lithium Corp.; Authier in Canada owned by Sayona Mining, and further expansion at 
Albemarle’s Silver Peak mine in the USA. 
 
  
                                                     





Appendix D: Summary Table of Potential Future Battery 
Technologies70 
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Energy 
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may be ready 
by 2020; EVs in 
2025 
May succeed 
Li-ion due to 
lower cost and 
higher capacity 
Low cost in 
par with lead 
acid. Can be 
fully 
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70 Battery University, Summary Table of Future Batteries, July 21, 2016, 
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